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The post-war growth experiences of developing countries lead to the idea that income equality 
may accelerate economic growth.    In this paper, a theoretical model showed the possibility that 
equality makes a country human-capital abundant, which enables industrialization and higher 
economic growth.  On the other hand, in unequal developing countries where majority of 
people manage to survive at minimum consumption level, human capital investment such as 
schooling cannot be done.    Such countries become unskilled labor abundant and suffer further 
from low economic growth.  In addition, the two-good framework showed the possibility that 
protecting infant industry with dynamic externality enhances economic growth.     
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     Recently, it is often advocated that equal income distribution accelerates 
economic growth of developing countries.  This argument is derived by empirical 
researches (Alesina and Rodrik, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1992, 1994) and rapid 
economic growth of the relatively equal East Asian Newly Industrializing Economies 
(World Bank, 1993).    Much research effort has been devoted to explain this fact. 
     Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) made a theoretical model that equality can 
enhance economic growth by enlarging the domestic demand for manufactured goods.  
Alesina and Perotti (1993) explained this phenomenon using the positive effect of 
equality on political stability.  On the other hand, the theory of social choice of the 
voters are adopted in the models by Alesina and Rodrick (1991), Perotti (1993) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1992, 1994).  Galor and Zeira (1993) suggest that equality 
enhance growth through rapid human capital accumulation. 
     This paper examines the effect of distribution on growth through human capital 
accumulation on the lines of Galor and Zeira (1993).  This paper, however, differs 
from other researches that the employed model is a two-good growth model.    By using 
a two-good framework, this model contributes to clarify the following two points in 
addition to the effect of distribution on growth. 
     First,  this  model  can  explain  that  an  economy  generally  experiences 
industrialization from agricultural economy when it grows rapidly.  Secondly, this 
model showed that protecting an infant industry with dynamic externality can enhance 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††
u.ac.jp economic growth.  Even when an economy does not have comparative advantage in 
manufacturing sector, protecting it can accelerate growth rate and raise the welfare of 
the economy. 
     The logic to support the above arguments is as follows.  In an equal developing 
country, large share of the people can receive education and the country becomes 
human-capital abundant.  Therefore, such a country has comparative advantage in the 
production of human-capital intensive good such as manufactured good.  As 
production of manufactured good exhibits externality and raises the general productivity 
through learning-by-doing, such equal country can experience the increase of 
productivity and average income.  Higher income raises the educational level in the 
next period, which further accelerates industrialization and economic growth (virtuous 
circle).    On the other hand, in an unequal economy, only a small number of rich people 
can afford education, which makes the economy unskilled labor abundant.    As a result, 
such an economy specializes in the production of agricultural good, productivity 
stagnates, and growth rate becomes lower (vicious circle).  Therefore, an economy 
becomes industrialized as it grows and protecting manufacturing sector enhances 
economic growth.  In addition, the model also examines how income distribution 
changes as the economy grows and shows the possibility that distribution changes as the 
inverted-U hypothesis of Kuznets (1955). 
     The  considered  model  extends  a  basic trade model of a small open economy with 
two goods and two factors in two aspects.    First, the factor endowments are determined 
endogenously, depending on distribution of income.  Secondly, overlapping 
generations model and endogenous growth theory are used to make the model dynamic in order to examine growth rate.  The static equilibrium of the model is examined in 
section 2, and the dynamic equilibrium in section 3.  Section 4 examines the policy 
implications, and the final section is summary and conclusion. 
 
2. The static equilibrium 
     A small country that trades two goods at exogenously given world prices is 
studied. The goods are Z (agricultural goods) and M (manufactured goods), which are 
produced using two factors: AtL (unskilled labor) and AtH (human capital).  The 
factors are not traded, and  At denotes the productivity level of factors.  Production 
technology exhibits constant returns to scale and time-invariant.  Manufactured goods 
are assumed to be relatively human-capital intensive, while agricultural goods be 
unskilled labor-intensive.  The economy produces both goods or specializes in the 
production of one of the goods, depending on the state of its comparative advantage.  
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.  These equilibria are examined in the 
following separate sections.  
2.1.    The case of incomplete specialization 
     In the case of incomplete specialization, the equilibrium can be shown in the 
following three stages. 
 
2.1.1 The determination of wage rates and input coefficients 
  In the first stage, incomplete specialization implies that unit cost of each good must 
be equal to its world price.    Namely, 
        wa w w wa w w P H HM H LL L M H L M (,) (,) + =                              ( 1 )  
and     
      w a ww w a ww P H HZ H LL L Z H L Z (,) (,) + = ,                              ( 2 )  
where  PM andP Z are respectively the world price of good M and Z,  wH and w are 
the rewards to human capital and low-skilled labor, and   denotes the unit 
input coefficient of factor j for good j’.  Note that w
L
aww jj H L ′(,)
H,   and aw  are 
measured with efficiency unit of inputs, namely, 
wL w L) jj′ H (,
1
At
.  The production technology is 
described by these unit input coefficients.    Given  PM andP Z, these equations give the 
equilibrium  wH,   and aw .  wL w jj H L ′(,)
 
2.1.2    Utility maximization and determination of factor supplies 
     In the second stage, given the wage rates determined in the first stage, altruistic 
individuals maximize their utility by choosing levels of their consumption and their 
children’s education, which subsequently determines the aggregate supply of human capital.  In each period t = 0, 1, 2, ⋅⋅⋅⋅∞, agents are born and live for two periods.  
Each agent gains one child at the beginning of the second period, and therefore the 
population is constant. 
      In the first period, individuals have no endowment of labor or goods.  They 
receive education financed by their parents and gain human capital.  In the second 
period, they are endowed with one unit of unskilled labor and work by supplying their 
labor inelastically.  They spend their wage to consume and educate their children.  
Some of the adults give education to their children as bequest, because agents are 
assumed to be altruistic and care also about their children’s income.  Agents born in 
period t and receive  ht units of education gain  ( ) t h φ  units of human capital.  When 
they work in period t+1, their productivity is  At+1 and they receive  Aw t L +1  for their 
unskilled labor and  Aw h t H t +1 φ()  for their human capital.  Therefore, the income of 
individuals who are born at period t and work at period t+1 is given by 
     Ay A w w h tt d tL H t ++ + =+ 11 1 (( ) ) φ .                                        ( 3 )  
Note that all individuals have same potential ability and differ only in their levels of 
education. 
     Given the above income, agents choose the levels of their consumption of each 
good and children’s education.  First, consider the optimization of the share of cMt+1 
and   for given amount spent on consumption.  The utility maximization problem 
is given by 
cZt+1
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Denote the Marshallian demand functions of this problem as   and 
.  As 
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*  and cZt+1
*   depend only on  ct+1.  
Therefore,  a  Hicks’  composite  good  can  be  defined  as                  
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which is called consumption thereafter and its price is one. 
     Secondly,  agents  choose ct+1 and ht+1.  They  solve 
      
ch max ( ) ( ( ( )))
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11
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st A w w h c h t L H t t t .. ( ( ) )       + + + + = + 11 1 φ α ††                  ( 8 )  
†    ht+ ≥ 1 0, ct+ ≥ 1 0,                                       ( 9 )  
where   is the utility from the adults’ consumption, v is the utility the altruistic 
parents gain from their children’s income, and 
u
α denotes the unit cost of education.  
Perfect foresight is assumed concerning the level of  At+2  and individuals treat  At+2 as 
given. 
The first constraint is an ordinary budget constraint, and the second and third are the 
non-negativity constraints on ht+1  and  ct+1 . It is assumed that 
′ > ′′< ′′′ < ′ > ′ < ′ > ′′ < uu u v v 0 0 0000 , , ,,,,       0 φ φ . 
     Using Lagrange multiplier λ and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers µ and η, the first-
order conditions of the above problem are given by the following equations and (8): 
              ′ =− ++ + uc t t t () 11 1 λ η †                                   ( 1 0 )  
††    ′ ′ = + + + + + v Aw h t H t t t (.) ( ) 21 1 1 φ λ α µ                            ( 1 1 )             µ µ t t t t hh + + + + ≥≥ = 11 1 1 00 ,, 0                             ( 1 2 )     
†η η t t t t cc + + + + ≥≥ = 11 1 1 00 ,,        0 ⸠†††††††††††††(13)  
 As there are Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the solutions can be divided into some cases. 
Assume, however, that the non-negativity constraint on consumption does not become 
binding as long as agents have positive income, because agents need to consume 
something to survive.  Therefore it is not necessary to examine the case with 
   and  ct t ++ => 11 00 µ , and ct+ > 1 0 and µt+ = 1 0 is assumed in the rest of the paper.  
On the other hand, the non-negativity constraint on educational level sometimes 
becomes binding and some very poor agents do not give any education to their children.   
Thus, solutions are divided into the two cases with  ht+ > 1 0 and ht+ = 1 0
h
.  Figure 2 
gives the income-expansion path with such utility function.  When income is lower 
than some level, the optimum choice becomes a corner solution with  t+ = 1 0. 
     W h e n     and   µt t h ++ = = 1 0 1 0 , the first-order conditions can be rewritten as 
















.                                      ( 1 4 )                
The level of income, A y t t ++ 11 ~ , which divides the two cases is given by the above 
equation for given At+1.  Then, when yy t t + + > 11 ~ , the non-negativity constraint on 
education is not binding and  ht+ > 1 0, when yy t t + + ≤ 11 ~ , it is binding and ht+ = 1 0.  
Note that  ~ yt+1 rises  if At+1 increases.†  
     In  the  first  case  with h y y t t t t + + + + > = > 11 1 00  and       1 µ ( ~ ) 




































腪.             ( 1 5 )  By differentiating the above equation, the comparative statics give the following results.   
When the parents’ income increases, their consumption and their children’s education 
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To exclude an unrealistic solution that educational level of children becomes infinite as 
the income level of parents rises,  ′′′ u is assumed to be negative.   
     In the second case with  ht+ = 1 0 ⁡湤 µt t t yy + + + ≥ ≤ 11 0 ( 1 ~ ) , the first-order 
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The levels of consumption and education are given by 
              cA y t t t + ++ = 11 1 ,                                           ( 1 9 )  
 ht+ = 1 0.                                                ( 2 0 )  
In this case, the parents are too poor to educate their children, and spend all their 
income on their consumption.  In the developing countries where the average income 
level is low, such households consist considerable part of the economy.   
     These optimum choices of the children’s education which satisfy the above first-
order conditions are shown in figure 3 for given  At+1.  Notice that education reaches 
zero level at positive  yt+1.   
          As shown above, the level of education is a function of the level of their parents’ income.  Thus, in the whole economy, the pattern of income distribution determines 
the aggregate level of education and human capital.  As income is approximately 
distributed lognormally, the three density functions of lognormal distribution with 
different variance and the same mean are shown in figure 4.    Figure 3 is put on figure 4 
in figure 5a and 5b.  Figure 5a shows an example that the larger the inequality 
(variance  σ
2) is, the less people can receive education and the lower the economy’s 
level of human capital, if average income is moderately low.  In other words, in an 
equal developing country large share of people can receive education and the country 
becomes human-capital abundant.  On the other hand, in an unequal country only a 
small number of people can receive education and therefore it becomes low-skilled 
labor abundant. 
     In a country where average income is extremely low, however, the opposite is 
true (Figure 5b).    If income is equally distributed, everyone is equally poor and unable 
to afford education.  If distribution is unequal, at least some of the agents can educate 
their children and therefore the country gains some aggregate human capital.     
     Using  the  above  relationship  between income distribution and factor endowment, 
the relationship between distribution of income and the pattern of production can be 
described.  As the considered economy is a developing country, assume that it either 
specializes in the production of agricultural good (Z) or produces both agricultural 
goods (Z) and manufacturing goods (M).     
      Consider, first, the case of a moderately poor country.  If distribution is 
unequal with σ ,  σ











< .  This economy 
㄰completely specializes in agriculture (z).  In a relatively equal country with  σ σ
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∈   ) ] and it incompletely specializes in production.  Namely, 
industrialization occurs in addition to agriculture.    Therefore, the case currently we are 
considering is a moderately equal country. 
M a Z A H HM t HZ t t +=
a M a Z A LM t LZ t t +=
Z
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(
     In an extremely poor country, the opposite relationship between inequality and 
factor ratio exists.  Therefore, unequal country has a better chance to succeed in 
industrialization. 
†  
2.1.3    The factor market equilibrium   
     In the third stage, given the factor supplies examined in the second stage, the 
amount of production of goods are determined in the equilibrium of the factor markets.   
Market clearing implies that 
† a t†                                       ( 2 1 )  
L.                                             ( 2 2 )  
Solving these two equation gives the equilibrium amount of production of each good as 
aA H L M t − t ) ,                                       ( 2 3 )    
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Therefore, the GNP at period t,  Qt, is given by   
†† Q P Z P M t d Zt M t = +  
=− + − + P
a
aA L aA H P
a
aA LaA H Z HM t LM t t M HZ t LZ t t { ( )} { ( )}
11
.         ( 2 5 )  
ㄱNotice that the level of GNP indicates the level of welfare, because the considered 
economy is a small country. 
 
2.2.    The case of complete specialization   
     If only small number of people can receive education, the economy becomes 
unskilled labor abundant.    Such country completely specializes in the production of the 
agricultural goods.  The equilibrium wwH L Z H L t t t ,,, ,  are  simultaneously 
determined by the following equations: 
wa wa P H HZL L ZZ += †                                        ( 2 6 )  
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st A w w h c h t L H t t t .. ( ( ) )       + + + + = + 11 1 φ α ††                     ( 2 7 )  
    †† ht+ ≥ 1 0, ct+ ≥ 1 0      ††††  
 
† a Z A H HZ t t = †                                      ( 2 8 )  
  a Z AL LZ t = .                                             ( 2 9 )  
The GNP is given by 
    Q P Z t Z t = .                                              ( 3 0 )  
 
3. Dynamic Equilibrium 
     Now consider how the economy evolves dynamically.  In dynamic equilibrium, 
the increase of  Ht and the learning-by-doing of manufacturing good production cause 
ㄲeconomic growth.    ww H L ,  ⰠHt, , M Z t t and At  are endogenously determined, while 






3.1  The  increase  of H  
     First, examine the effects of the increase of aggregate human capital,  Ht.  As 
shown in the previous section, adults determine their children’s educational level and 
income for given   and  .  As a result, the educational level in each dynasty 
changes and as does the aggregate human capital.  In order to illustrate the dynamic 
evolution of education and income through time, the dynamics of  yt  based on figure 3 
is presented in figure 6 for given  .    As the educational level corresponds to income 
level by one-to-one in this model, this figure represents the evolution of educational 
level  ht  as well as  . 
     The figure 6 depicts the case where the dynamics of  yt intersects with the 45° 
line at two points.  In this case, the descendants of rich individuals with income more 
than   receive more and more education and converge to the high-level equilibrium 
with income  .  On the other hand, the descendants of poor agents with income less 
than   may receive some education but converge to the low level equilibrium with 
zero education and low income.  In other words, all the dynasties are concentrated in 






3.2    The increase of productivity through learning-by-doing 
     Secondly, consider the effect of learning-by-doing. In the country where 
ㄳindustrialization occurs, learning-by-doing raises the factor productivity At  and 
accelerate economic growth.  Namely, the cumulative amount of produced 
manufacturing goods raise the factor productivity  At as described by the following 
functions: 
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For the sake of discussion, assume that knowledge accumulation of manufacturing 
sector completely spillovers to the agricultural sector and raises the factor productivity 
of agricultural sector at the same rate of the manufacturing sector.  This case is 
analytically interesting and mainly considered in this paper.  The other case with 
incomplete knowledge spillover is briefly examined in the last section. 
     In a relatively equal country, industrialization occurs and it raises At.  The 
effects of increase of  At can be examined by differentiating the first-order-conditions.  
The following assumption is imposed to analyze this effect. 
 
Assumption 1 
       () { } () 1   ) ( 1 2 < ⋅ ′ + ⋅ ′ ′ + + v h w w A v t H L t − φ  
 
This means that the measure of comparative risk aversion is small enough and 
intertemporal substitution is large.  Therefore, when At+2 rises and the return to 
education increases, the optimal educational level of children ht increases under this 
ㄴassumption. 
     In case 1, for given  yt, 
() ( )
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u n d e r   a s s u m p t i o n   1 .   T h e r e f o r e ,                       
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and educational level rises. 
In case 2, educational level remains zero.  As for the income level which divides the 
two cases,     
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under assumption 1.    Therefore,   



















0 <                                               ( 3 8 )  
and increase of productivity enables more individuals to receive education. 
     Therefore, this effects can be shown in figures by the upward shift of the 
dynamics of yt as At approaches the upper bound A (Figure 7).  Non-negativity 
constraint on consumption become unbinding for more individuals, and more and more 
dynasties approach the high-level equilibrium.    As  A assumed  to  satisfy w , all  c
A
L ≥
ㄵthe dynasties start to converge to the high-level equilibrium as infinite time passes.   
     In an unequal country where no manufacturing goods are produced, no learning-
by-doing occurs and the dynamics are completely described by figure 6.  In this case, 
the growth occurs only by the increase of  Ht.  Therefore, growth rate is lower than 
that in the equal country where industrialization takes place. 
     Next, examine how the income distribution changes as the economy grows.  In 
an unequal economy which completely specializes in agriculture, individuals become 
polarized into the rich and the poor as shown in figure 6.  Therefore, an originally 
unequal country become unequal and poor. 
     In an equal economy, at first polarization takes place.  Some of the agents 
approaches the high-level equilibrium, while the rest moves toward the low-level 
equilibrium.  Next,  as 
c
At
  declines, more and more people become richer and educate 
their children.    This further increase their income and accelerate industrialization until 
all people reach high-education and high-income equilibrium.  In this process, 
inequality first rises and then declines.  Therefore, there is a possibility that income 
distribution changes as the inverted-U hypothesis by Kuznets (Kuznets 1955). 
     
4. The Effects of Government Policies 
     In  this  section,  the  implications  of three government policies on economic growth 
and welfare are considered.  The policies are income redistribution, subsidy on 
education and import tariffs. 
   
ㄶ4.1. The Optimal Income Redistribution Policy 
     It is interesting to analyze what kind of income redistribution favors economic 
growth.  For analytical purpose, assume that income follows a uniform distribution  
U[, ] µ σ µ σ −+   .  Then, the variance of income is σ
2 3 and the ratio of the agents 
who can receive education is µ σ σ + − $ y 2 .  Consider the welfare implications of a 
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  indicate the following results. 
     In countries which are not extremely poor with µ > $ y, the more equally income 
is redistributed, the more agents receive education.    It raises the level of human capital   
and the growth rate.  This result is consistent with the findings that equal East Asian 
countries grew faster than unequal Latin American countries.    
     In the very poor countries with µ < $ y, on the other hand, the more unequally 
income is redistributed, the more agents can receive education.  This is because 
everyone is too poor to educate his/her child if distribution is equal, but some rich can 
afford education if distribution is unequal.  Therefore, unequal redistribution raise the 
aggregate human capital, growth rate and steady-state income level.  This effect is 
particularly clear when the country become incompletely specialized from complete 
specialization.   
 
4.2. Subsidy to education 
     When government gives subsidy to education and lowers the cost of education 
ㄷfrom  α  to  () α ψ − 1 , its effects on the optimal choice of agents are as follows.  
Assuming incomplete specialization, the effects can be shown by comparative statics 
with differentiating equations (14), (15) and (20) and evaluating the derivative at  ψ = 0. 
In Case 1, from equation (15), 
( ) ( )
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indicates that agents gives more education to their children with the subsidy to 
education. 
     In  case  2,  from  equation  (20), 
      ht+ = 1 0 
indicates that very poor agents still cannot give any education to their children, even if 
education is subsidized.     



















                                          ( 4 1 )       
shows that ratio of individuals who can receive education increases. 
     This effect can be shown as the upward shift of  ( ) t t y h 1 + .  Subsidy enables the 
agents who are originally receive any education to gain more education, and increases 
the number of agents who can receive education.  As a whole economy, level of 
education always rises, which accelerate industrialization and raise the steady-state 
level of income.     
 
ㄸ4.3. Import Tariff on Manufactured goods 
     What are the welfare implications of trade policy?  To clarify the results, 
examine this policy with specific Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions. 
             ()
γ γ δ δ
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Assuming incomplete specialization, factor prices changes as the domestic prices of the 
manufactured good changes with the import tariff.     
      
dw
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,
 When the tariff rate is denoted by TM, the assumption of a small country ensures 
dP dT M M = .  These conditions enables to examine the effects of import tariff on the 
optimal choice of education
1.       
          In case 1, the first-order-condition of utility maximization is given by 
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Total differentiation of this condition implies         
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Therefore, combining equations (40) and (41), the effects of import tariff on education 
























Ⱐ††††††††††††††††(45)    †††††
which is positive if γ <12   ( Q ) δ γ − > 0 .  This condition has the following 
implications. 
     W h e n  d o m e s t i c  PM rises due to import tariff,  wH increases and w  decreases 
as unit cost curve of good M shifts to the right in figure 1 (Stolper-Samuelson Theorem).   
If 
L
γ  is small enough and good Z is very unskilled labor intensive, wH increases 
largely and    decreases only slightly.    In this case, parent’s income increases and it  wL
ㄹraises the children’s educational level and income, because children’s income is 
assumed to be a normal good.  Therefore, if γ <12, import tariff raises the 
educational level and human capital.  This argument shows that protecting a industry 
with externality such as manufacturing can accelerate economic growth, even if the 
country currently does not have comparative advantage in such an industry (Infant 
industry). 
L
     The case with incomplete knowledge spillover from learning by doing can be 
analyzed in the present context.    If productivity in the manufacturing sector rises more 
than that in the agricultural sector, the unit cost curve of good M in figure 1 shifts to the 
right more than good Z.  Therefore,  wH increases and w  decreases, which changes 
the educational level of children.  This effect on human capital and growth are the 
same as the case of import tariff on good M.  Thus, in this case of incomplete 
knowledge spillover, learning-by-doing in manufacturing sector raises growth rates only 
when good Z is very unskilled labor intensive. 
 
Conclusion  
     The post-war growth experiences of developing countries lead to the idea that 
income equality may accelerate economic growth.  In this paper, a theoretical model 
showed the possibility that equality makes a country human-capital abundant, which 
enables industrialization and higher economic growth.  In addition, the two-good 
framework showed the possibility that protecting infant industry with dynamic 
externality enhances economic growth.     
     Two additional extensions can be addressed in future work.  First, unequal 
㈰distribution may lower economic growth rate through higher population growth.  As 
shown in Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), if quantity 
and “quality” of children are substitutes, poor households tend to have many children 
with low education.    Therefore, in an unequal economy with large number of the poor, 
population growth rate is higher and the economy becomes more unskilled labor 
abundant, which further deters industrialization.  Secondly, whether the comparative 
advantage explanations will pass a proper econometric investigation should be 
examined in future work.   
 
F o o t n o t e                          
1 When domestic  P
M   changes due to import tariff, the price of the composite good  CP C P C
t M Mt Z Zt =+  
changes.  In this case, however, Cobb-Douglas utility function ensures the constant expenditure share 
for 
t and  C Ay y
tt ++ −
22 , and it is unnecessary to examine the effect of the change of  P
Mt on  education. 
††  
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